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Abstract
Modeled rank order tests have become a powerful tool to infer discrimination
through observational outcome data such as police search success rates or errors in
court decisions. The tests predict that outcomes that are born out of prejudice by
decisionmakers will violate certain rank order patterns among the treated groups.
This paper presents an unnoticed issue in these tests. I advance a rank order model
that includes strategic behavior of the treated with respect to the decisionmakers
beliefs about them. This feedback mechanism can give rise to multiple equilibria,
which can invalidate the use of the test.
University of Basel, Faculty of Business and Economics, Peter Merian-Weg 6, 4002 Basel, Switzer-
land, and ETH Zurich, CER Center of Economic Research, ZUE F11, Zurichbergstrasse 18, 8092 Zurich
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Brigitte Guggisberg for their help on this project. Funding for this research was generously provided by
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by the Swiss National Science Foundation.
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1 Introduction
Disentangling the causes for disparate outcomes in observational data is riddled with
di¢ culties. Economics has embraced a host of increasingly sophisticated techniques to
answer the question if di¤erences in, say, labor market outcomes between agents like men
and women can be attributed, if anything, to taste-based discrimination or statistical
discrimination by decisionmakers (Guryan and Charles, 2012). Recently, a promising
avenue has been paved by so-called rank order tests. One of the main issues in de-
tecting taste-based discrimination by disparate treatment is that the treated agents are
likely to di¤er in a myriad of unobserved characteristics which can a¤ect the observed
outcomes. Rank order tests, a rened specication of outcome tests, circumvent this
inference problem by putting the cart before the horse, so to speak. Instead of trying to
gather information on the agentscharacteristics, outcome tests focus on the agentsout-
comes on the notion that the outcomes are an indicator of preceding disparate treatment
by malevolent decisionmakers. The idea is that all outcome-relevant information about
the agents was processed during the decisionmaking and is thus reected in the outcome
data, obviating the need for collecting microlevel data about the agents.
Consider rst a classic outcome test example. Specically, the decision to grant
mortgages, and the question whether that process is racially prejudiced. A bank is to
judge applications for mortgages from black and white applicants. During the decision
process, that bank constructs some score of applicant creditworthiness which inversely
links to default risk. At some level of creditworthiness, the bank will deem that risk
acceptable and all mortgage applications that satisfy that level will be granted. Some of
the granted mortgages will inevitably default, but at a lower rate than the ones below the
acceptance level would have. This mechanism can inform about racial prejudice. If the
bank is biased, it holds the disadvantaged group to a higher standard of creditworthiness,
driving down the average default rates of their granted applications. One might be
tempted to infer prejudice from a comparison between average default rates. After all, if
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one group exhibits a lower default rate, the bank obviously foregoes good risks, risks which
it "pays" with its taste for discrimination. But because we have not assumed anything
about the distributions of creditworthiness between the two groups, the average default
rates between black and white mortgage owners may di¤er even if the bank is unbiased
(Yinger, 1996). Enter rank order tests. Consider other banks facing the same pool of
mortgage applicants. These banks may have di¤erent risk preferences; some could be
more prudent and others more lenient in granting mortgages. If the banking system as a
whole unbiased, however, the racial rank order of the default rates should be the same at
all banks. That is to say, if at one bank black applicants have higher default rates than
white applicants, black applicants should have higher default rates at any bank.
This example captures the essence of rank order tests for prejudice. We do not need
detailed (and hence likely unobtainable) information on each applicants characteristics;
a simple comparison of their outcome data will do. The microeconomic framework that
underlies rank order tests was established by Anwar and Fang (2006), who apply their
model to motor vehicle search data in Florida. Anwar and Fang check whether the rank
order of police o¢ cerssearch success rates (grouped by o¢ cer race) depends on the race
of the motorists. If so, their model would imply that o¢ cers use suspicion thresholds
(for searching a vehicle) that depend on the race of the motorist; evidence of prejudice.
This is not the case in their data. The results of the empirical analysis are consistent
with the hypothesis of an unprejudiced police force. Addressing the same setting, Close
and Mason (2007) apply a similar rank order test to a slightly extended data set and
reject the hypothesis of no prejudice. Anbarci and Lee (2014), too, take a close look
at prejudice in policing, but are concerned with discretionary behavior in issuing tra¢ c
tickets. Their ndings imply that o¢ cers in Boston are racially biased. Anwar, Bayer,
and Hjalmarsson (2010) turn to the question of prejudice in criminal trials. They test
their model prediction that in the absence of prejudice, a jury that holds a lower threshold
for conviction should convict both black and white defendants on average more than a
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jury with a higher threshold. Put di¤erently, the rank order of conviction of defendants
of each race should not depend on the type of jury. The authors apply their test to 401
felony trials in Sarasota County in Florida and nd evidence of prejudice.1 Alesina and
La Ferrara (2014) collect and analyze a data set on capital punishments in the United
States. Their modeling of the courtsdecisionmaking process implies that for all racial
defendant groups the rank order of error rates (as subsequently uncovered by higher
courts) across victim race should be the same if courts are unbiased. Their empirical
ndings do not satisfy the model prediction, implying the presence of racial prejudice
in their data. Finally, Ili´c (2016) considers municipalities in Switzerland, each of which
decides on their local citizenship applications. Allowing municipalities to vary in their
strictness for naturalilzation, unbiasedness implies that the rank order of the applications
rejection rates, grouped by country of origin, should be the same for all municipalities.
The empirical analysis exploits an exogenous variation by a court ruling and rejects
the hypothesis of no prejudice in a within-municipality-test in one of the six observed
municipalities.
The literature on rank order tests shares the implicit assumption that the agentsbe-
havior is not a¤ected by the decisionmakersbeliefs about them. When a decisionmaker
interprets an agents signal to extract information, he combines that signal with a prior,
an exogenous belief about that agents group. This is the statistical discrimination com-
ponent in these models. In this paper, I show that once we allow for this belief to become
endogenous, things can go awry. In their seminal contribution on endogenous beliefs and
stereotypes, Coate and Loury (1993) demonstrate how two ex ante identical groups may
position in di¤erent, Pareto ranked, equilibria. Specically, negative stereotypes about
a group in form of poor beliefs may drive agents to a worse, self-fullling equilibrium.
I incorporate Coate and Lourys approach by taking the example of Ili´cs (2016) rank
order model. Municipalities grant citizenships, and applicants make a decision about
1The published version of their paper restricts its empirical analysis to exploiting the quasi-random
variation in the composition of the seated jury (Anwar, Bayer, and Hjalmarsson, 2012).
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an investment to become qualied for naturalization, taking into account the prevailing
stereotype about the group they belong to.
2 An Endogenous Rank Order Model
Consider a number of municipal councils c 2 fc1; c2;:::g that separately evaluate their local
immigrants applying for naturalization. Each council faces the same pools of applicants,
continuums that are grouped into country of origin a 2 fa1; a2; :::g. For the purpose
of this paper, consider two municipalities and two applicant groups. The model readily
extends to m municipalities and n applicant groups.
Councils want to grant citizenship to applicants only if they are qualied for nat-
uralization. All applicants, qualied or not, prefer to be naturalized, for they would
gain the payo¤ !. If their application is rejected, their payo¤ is zero. Councils receive
a payo¤ xq;c;a > 0 if they grant a qualied applicant citizenship but are left with a
loss of  xu;c;a < 0 if they naturalize an unqualied applicant (naturalizations are irre-
versible). Councils may di¤er in their payo¤s and losses independent of country of origin.
This would reect a variation of strictness or leniency or more lenient in their general
tendency to grant citizenship. Councils may also di¤er in their payo¤s dependent on
country of origin, reecting prejudice.
Applicants are not born qualied for naturalization. In order to become qualied,
they must invest in some costly skill investment, for example, getting accustomed to
local traditions, learning the local language, or reaching some level of human capital.
Let the cost of this investment ia be heterogenous across applicants in each group. The
distribution of ia follows the cumulative distribution function Ga(). Ga() may be group
dependent, implying that some groups may have higher investment costs on average
because of their socio-economic background. The application itself does not entail costs.
Individual skill investments are imperfectly observable by the councils. Specically,
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councils observe country of origin a¢ liation a and a noisy signal  2 [0; 1]. This signal
is drawn from the interval [0; 1] according to the probability density function fq() if the
applicant is qualied and according to fu() if the applicant is unqualied. The signal
is assumed to be informative about skill investment in the sense that the distributions
fq() and fu() satisfy the Monotone Likelihood Ratio Property (MLRP): l()  fq()fu() is
strictly increasing in .
The timing of the game is as follows: First, Nature draws the applicantstypes, that
is, their skill investment cost ia. After observing their type, applicants make their skill
investment decision and then apply for citizenship. Councils then decide whether to grant
citizenship based on the applicantsgroup a¢ lliation and his or her signal of qualication.
Let us rst derive the councilsbest response. Suppose that a council evaluates an
applicant with signal  from group a, which has an average qualication (according to the
councils prior beliefs) of a. The posterior probability that such an applicant is qualied
follows from Bayesrule:
p(; a) =
afq()
afq() + (1  a)fu()
The councils expected payo¤ from granting that applicant citizenship is therefore
p(; a)xq;c;a   [1  p(; a)]xu;c;a
So citizenship will only be granted if above expression is equal to or greater than
zero. Put di¤erently, the council will require a signal threshold value c(a), the standard
required for naturalization, where c(a) is pinned down by
l()  fq()
fu()
=
1  a
a
xu;c;a
xq;c;a
(1)
In what follows, we focus on the interior solution of equation (1). How does the
threshold value of c(a) change with the councils prior beliefs? It seems intuitive that
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the better the councils prior beliefs, the lower the threshold c(a) will be set. Following
Coate and Loury (1993), the MLRP implies that c is strictly decreasing in a:
dc
da
=  l0(c(a))xu;c;a
xq;c;a
1
2a
< 0 (2)
Note that the level of the relationship of c on a depends on the ratio
xu;c;a
xq;c;a
. If
unbiased, this reects the heterogeneity in strictness among councils.
Let us now turn to the applicants best response in view of the councils optimal
thresholds c(a). For an applicant from group a, the skill investment cost amounts to
ia and yields a probability of 1 Fq(c) of receiving citizenship. Investing thus entails an
expected payo¤ of 
1  Fq(c)

!   ia
Without investing, there is also a chance of being (mistakenly) granted citizenship.
In that case, the payo¤ is

1  Fu(c)

!
Investing thus becomes worthwhile if and only if the skill investment costs are lower
than the expected benet subject to the threshold c:
ia  B(c) 

Fu(c)  Fq(c)

!
Note that B0(c) = !

fu(c)  fq(c)

> 0 only if fq()
fu()
< 1: B() is therefore a single-
peaked function with B(0) = B(1) = 0 (see Coate and Loury, p.1225).
We now turn to the equilibrium of this game. Consider rst the interaction of one
council with one applicant group. Faced with the naturalization threshold , the fraction
of applicants that invests in skills is the fraction of applicants whose investment costs are
below B(), that is
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G(B()) = G(

Fu()  Fq()

!)
Since G(B()) is a positive monotone transformation of B(), it is also single-peaked
with G(B(0)) = G(B(1)) = 0. An equilibrium exists if the beliefs of the council are
self-conrming, that is, when those beliefs induce the applicants to invest precisely at the
rate postulated by the beliefs. Formally, an equilibrium is a pair of (

; ) such that


= () (3)
and
 = G(B(

))
where the rst condition describes the equlibrium council behavior and the second con-
dition describes the equilbrium applicant behavior.
Figure 1: Equilibrium in Applicant and Council Responses
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An equilibrium is not necessarily stable in the sense that we can assume an adjustment
process of t+1 = G(B(

)) with t = 0; 1; 2; :::(Coate and Loury, p.1126). Local stability
is only given if, at the point of intersection, the absolute value of the slope of the applicant
best response function is lower than the one of the councils best response function. Also
note that the equilibrium - if it exists - can have multiple solutions. This is evident in
Figure 1, which sketches the applicant (in red) and council (in blue) response functions
G(B()) and [()] 1 (where the latter is the inverse of equation (3) and thus also
strictly decreasing in  because of equation (2)). The multiple solutions involve so-
called discriminatory equilibria, equilibria in which a negative belief about a group is
self-conrming and associated with a higher standard. In Figure 1, such equilibria can
be seen in the downward sloping domain of the applicant best response function. For the
remainder of this section, let us focus on the non-discriminatory and stable equlibrium
in the upward sloping domain in Figure 1.
Let us now extend the involved parties. First, add a second applicant group a2, which
we dene to have higher investment costs on average, that is, Ga2(i) < Ga1(i). As can
be seen in Figure 2, this implies that the best response function of group a2 (in green)
lies strictly below the one of group a1. Equilibrium for group a2 is thus associated with
a higher signal threshold and a lower fraction of qualied applicants. In the upward
sloping domain, this inverse relationship always holds: Higher investment costs entail
higher signal thresholds and lower shares of qualication.
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Figure 2: Multiple Equilibria with Two Councils and Two
Applicant Groups
In a second step, add a second council c2. Let this council be more lenient with
respect to its requirement for naturalization. From equation (1) we can gather that this
may be because council c2 gains more from naturalizing qualied applicants or because it
loses less from mistakenly naturalizing unqualied applicants. In Figure 2, this draws a
best response function for council c2 (in orange) that lies strictly below the one of council
c1. Like in council c1, in council c2 the applicant group with the higher investment costs
a2 faces a higher signal threshold and has a lower fraction of qualied applicants than
group a1. The rank order thus remains the same with the introduction of heterogeneity
in council strictness. The implied rank order gives rise to a test for prejudice. Applicant
groups may di¤er in investment costs, and councils may di¤er in strictness. But if
councils are not prejudiced, the applicant rejection rates should have the same ranking in
all councils. Otherwise, in at least one municipality applicants are not being evaluated by
objective criteria. So far, this establishes a conventional rank order test. The reasoning,
however, only holds when we consider the upward sloping domain of the applicant best
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response function G(B()).
3 Multiple Equilibria
The reason why Pareto-worse equilibria may exist in this model is because a councils
assessment about the applicantsqualications is a combination of individual signals and
(self-sustaining) beliefs about the applicant groups. If the council holds negative beliefs
in a discriminatory equilibrium, the a¤ected applicants are discouraged from investing
in requirements for naturalization. Recall that not all equilibria are stable. The dis-
criminatory equlibria are located in the downward sloping domain of the applicant best
response function. In that domain, the conditions for stability hold only in equlibria
where the council best response function cuts the applicant best response function from
above. There is no limit to the number of stable equilibria in this model, but for the
purpose of this paper it su¢ ces to look at one stable discriminatory equilibria.
From Figure 2 we can glean that the discriminatory equilibrium implies the same
rank order for the qualied fractions of applicants among the two applicant groups as the
non-discriminatory equilibrium does. It is easy to show that any stable equilibria will
keep the rank orders intact. As long as all applicant groups in a given municipality end
up in the same ordinal equilibrium, the rank order rationale holds and allows for testing
for prejudice among all councils.
Matters are less comforting when, within a council, applicant groups end up in di¤er-
ent ordinal equilibria. For a given applicant group, discriminatory equilibria have lower
fractions of qualied applicants. In Figure 2 this would mix up the rank orders if only
the applicant group with the lower investment cost, a1, nds itself in the discriminatory
equilibrium in either council, c1 or c2. The rank order pattern that implies unbiasedness,
namely that no matter the council, the share of qualied applicants is higher among a1
than among a2, fails to hold even though no council is prejudiced. Testing for prejudice
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with the rank order test would mistakenly detect taste-based discrimination when, in
fact, negative beliefs cause the breach in rank order.
4 Conclusion
This paper reveals a neglected issue in rank order tests for prejudice. Once we allow
for the decisionmakers beliefs to a¤ect the agents behavior, multiple equilibria can
arise. The rank order test cannot di¤erentiate between e¤ects of prejudice and e¤ects
of applicants ending up in di¤erent equilibria; the two are observationally equivalent.
This conation is not restricted to the particular model presented in this paper. Any
setting where the decisionmakersbeliefs about the agentsquality a¤ect their incentives
to acquire said quality is prone to exhibit multiple equilibria.
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